There has been no credible evidence so far of any mastermind having orchestrated the various serious acts of jihadi terrorism reported during 2003, whether from Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq or Turkey. The available evidence indicates that all these incidents were planned and executed by local elements, which share the pan-Islamic ideology of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF), but not necessarily their priorities.
There has been no credible evidence so far of any mastermind having orchestrated the various serious acts of jihadi terrorism reported during 2003, whether from Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Iraq or Turkey. The available evidence indicates that all these incidents were planned and executed by local elements, which share the pan-Islamic ideology of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF), but not necessarily their priorities. The terrorist attacks were carried out by local elements for local reasons except in Saudi Arabia, where the motivation has been partly domestic and partly pan-Islamic.
Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri were more heard than seen. While audio and video cassettes purporting to carry their messages were periodically disseminated from Pakistan through Al Jazeera TV channel, there has been no human intelligence report of their having been actually seen anywhere. Pakistani media reports had claimed that during his preliminary interrogation by Pakistani officials after his capture at Rawalpindi in March last, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) had indicated that bin Laden was alive, but it is not known whether he repeated this assertion before the US interrogators after he was handed over to the US by Pakistan. The position that “they are presumed to be alive unless proved to be dead” continues.
Barring the terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia, where the signature and smell of Al Qaeda were clearly evident, there has been no credible evidence so far of the involvement of Al Qaeda in any of the other jihadi terrorist incidents, despite suspicions or claims to the contrary by local investigating officials, as in Turkey, for example. The fact, often cited, that some of the perpetrators had been to training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan does not necessarily mean that they were acting at the instance of Al Qaeda or bin Laden. Such presumptions seeking to project bin Laden and Al Qaeda as masterminding every major act of jihadi terrorism anywhere in the world is unwisely creating an image of Al Qaeda as if it is another super power confronting the US and of bin Laden as the Napoleon of jihadi terrorism, a master strategist planning and co-ordinating acts of jihadi terrorism here, there, everywhere. The unwitting creation of such images of a despicable terrorist is unwise and could prove counter-productive.
The Taliban, which with the help of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami staged a highly disturbing come-back in the Pashtun areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan between August and November, seems to have lost somewhat the momentum of its operations in the last few weeks of the year, but it still retains the motivation, following and capability to step up its operations once again when the circumstances are favourable. There has been no evidence of any Al Qaeda involvement in the Taliban’s offensive. It is an offensive planned and executed by the Taliban with the help of its Pakistani supporters and from sanctuaries in Pakistan.
Pakistan continues to be the main sanctuary of the dregs of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Chechens, the Uighurs and the South-East Asian terrorists, who had escaped from Afghanistan after the US military offensive started on October 7,2001, as well as of the jihadi terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and other parts of India. The jihadi training infrastructure previously located in Afghanistan is now located in Pakistani territory, mainly in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan). The military-controlled regime continues to be reluctant to act effectively against the terrorist infrastructure in its territory.While the training to foreign jihadis in the Afghan camps used to be imparted by Arab and Chechen instructors, the training in the present Pakistani camps is being imparted largely by Pakistanis.
While the Lhaskar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), a member of the IIF, continued to indulge in anti-Shia terrorism in Balochistan and Sind, 2003 saw no major act of terrorism directed against Western nationals or interests in Pakistan. This was due to the action taken by the military-intelligence establishment against some operatives of Al Qaeda and against the Pakistani components of the IIF which had attacked Western nationals and interests repeatedly during 2002. These organisations, which consequently suffered some attrition during 2003, have been trying to re-group, re-train and re-motivate their cadres before they strike again. The two daring attempts to kill President General Pervez Musharraf in December,2003, mark the resurgence of these elements after lying low for 11 months. The investigations made so far do not give a clear indication of the identity of the organisation behind them.The Pakistani authorities claim to have succeeded in identifying the two suicide bombers involved in the incident of December 25,2003, as a Kashmiri from the POK belonging to the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), which is also a member of the IIF, and an Afghan from the Panjsher Valley of Afghanistan belonging to a hitherto little known organisation called Afghan Jihad.There are still many unanswered questions and hence it would be premature to assess whether there was any Al Qaeda involvement or whether it was an operation mounted by locaL elements associated with Al Qaeda at their own initiative for their own reasons such as Musharraf’s role in the US operations in Afghanistan and his perceived humiliation of some Pakistani nuclear scientists at the instance of the US by subjecting them to interrogation on their links with North Korea, Iran and Libya. The two anti-Musharraf statements attributed to al-Zawahiri during the year and the one anti-Pakistan statement attributed to bin Laden indicate the possibility of an Al Qaeda inspiration for the attacks, if not direct involvement. Musharraf’s surprise compromise deal with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the six-party coalition of pro-Taliban and pro-bin Laden religious fundamentalist parties, is a desperate attempt to pacify Al Qaeda and the IIF through the leaders of the coalition. It remains to be seen whether he would succeed.
Al Qaeda dregs in Pakistan are now concentrated in the FATA, the NWFP and Balochistan.The presence of some sleeper cells in the Rawalpindi cantonment adjoining Islamabad is also strongly suspected. After the April,2003,arrest of Walid bin Attash, a suspect in the attack on the US naval ship USS Cole at Aden in October,2000,and his handing-over to the US, there have been no reports of any major presence of Al Qaeda dregs in Karachi. A number of Arabs, supposedly linked to Al Qaeda, were arrested by the Pakistani authorities in different parts of the country during 2003, but the suspicion of their links to Al Qaeda remained uncorroborated. Al Qaeda’s command and control remains disrupted, but its anti-US and anti-Israel motivation remains unimpaired despite the attrition in its leadership and ranks. However, there has been no evidence of any fresh recruitment and training after October 7,2001. All fresh recruits, who have come out of the training camps in Pakistan after October 7,2001, either belonged to the Pakistani componernts of the IIF or to other national or regional jihadi terrorist organisations such as the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) of South-East Asia and not to Al Qaeda. An anti-Indian and an anti-Hindu motive became evident for the first time in the propaganda of Al Qaeda during 2003. Its anger also continues to be directed against other nations such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Norway (for reasons not clear) and Australia, perceived as US surrogates.
Waziristan in the FATA continued to figure in reports received during 2003 as an important sanctuary not only for the dregs of Al Qaeda, but also for the Chechen and Uighur dregs, who managed to escape from Afghanistan. Under US pressure, the Pakistan army mounted a seemingly serious counter-terrorist operation in that area, but with meagre results. Many of the Chechens, who had taken shelter there, are since reported to have gravitated to Iraq. Despite this, the FATA in general and Waziristan in particular remain an important launching-board for jihadi terrorism directed against Western, Israeli, Chinese, Russian and Indian nationals and interests.
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